|The first excerpt represents the past or something you must release, and is drawn from The Great Big Treasury of Beatrix Potter by Beatrix Potter:
upon the patchwork quilt, was a skein
of cherry-coloured twisted silk, and
beside his bed stood the repentant
The sun was shining on the snow
when the tailor got up and dressed,
and came out into the street with
Simpkin running before him.
"Alack," said the tailor, "I have my
twist; but no more strength--nor
time--than will serve to make me one
|The second excerpt represents the present or the deciding factor of the moment, and is drawn from The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson:
"Is that from Dr. Jekyll, sir?" inquired the clerk. "I
thought I knew the writing. Anything private, Mr. Utterson?
"Only an invitation to dinner. Why? Do you want to see it?"
"One moment. I thank you, sir;" and the clerk laid the two
sheets of paper alongside and sedulously compared their contents.
"Thank you, sir," he said at last, returning both; "it's a very
There was a pause, during which Mr. Utterson struggled with
himself. "Why did you compare them, Guest?" he inquired suddenly.
"Well, sir," returned the clerk, "there's a rather singular
resemblance; the two hands are in many points identical: only
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
|The third excerpt represents the future or something you must embrace, and is drawn from Philebus by Plato:
places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should
proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before
assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out
and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained
to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the
infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and
knowledge after their kinds.
III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a
generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from
good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the
nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to,